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Abstract
For many low-income countries, there has been an extended period in which fiscal
policy was not a choice, or was a choice made by authorities external to the country. For
a number of them, this situation is now changing. Their own success in stabilising the
economy, coupled with a shift in the stance of the international community (most
notably the IMF), has placed fiscal choices back on the domestic agenda. However, the
scope for choice may be heavily circumscribed by the legacy of past fiscal laxity. There
are two challenges to the domestic fiscal authority in these circumstances. First they
must gauge how best to manage the transition from the immediate post-stabilisation
period to the longer term (post-post-stabilisation). Second, they must see how these
longer term fiscal choices can best accommodate the requirements of preserving
macroeconomic stability with the encouragement of growth and poverty reduction.
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1 Introduction
The design of fiscal policy in low-income countries has recently become a much more
active focus for debate within and between the international financial institutions and
the donors, as well as in the countries themselves. There are three reasons for this
increased attention.
Successful stabilisation
The first reason is that a number of governments have largely succeeded in stabilising
and disinflating their economies, often making use of a rather draconian device for
controlling aggregate spending, the ‘cash budget’. This success means that, within the
set of possible policy choices, there is now a range of viable (sustainable) alternatives.
One choice may be judged better than the others, but there is a choice. Previously, a
history of fiscal indiscipline had often yielded high inflation, depleted foreign exchange
reserves, a private sector starved of credit, a flight from domestic currency, foreign
exchange rationing, and an overvalued exchange rate. In these circumstances, rapid
reduction of the fiscal deficit became an imperative. There might have been limited
room for manoeuvre on the speed of adjustment, provided donors were content to
supply the accommodating finance, but there was none on the direction of change.
Fiscal policy had simply become a matter of progressively lowering the deficit, and
there was little scope for discretion. In effect, governments had placed themselves at a
boundary of the possible policy space; they were at a corner solution. Post-stabilisation,
they are once again in the interior of the viable policy space, and can exercise choice.
The IMF
The second reason is that the IMF has also been rethinking its position. In the
circumstances described in the previous paragraph, it had often found itself in the
position of a crisis manager. The lack of discretion available to the government was
equally binding on the Fund in its role as the international community’s watchdog on
fiscal probity. Fiscal policy had to be directed at stabilisation, and it was incumbent on
the Fund to insist on this. As a number of governments succeeded in stabilising their
economies, alternative fiscal choices could again be contemplated. The Fund was often
slow to acknowledge this, and came under increasingly heavy criticism for
inflexibility.1 Academic observers, NGOs, and also several of the bilateral donors
became concerned that this inflexibility was pre-empting policy debate (IMF 1998).
Recently, the Fund has been undergoing a major rethinking of its role. This has involved
a shift towards recognising the desirability of greater flexibility in fiscal targets coupled
with greater national ‘ownership’ of policy. This confers increased scope but also
greater responsibility on governments to examine the options and choose between them.
1 The Fund is often portrayed as being exceptionally monolithic. In fact, there was considerable variety
in the extent of its inflexibility/flexibility, depending on the make-up of different country teams.2
While the primary dialogue on fiscal matters will remain one between the government
and the Fund, it should also involve other donors, especially to the extent that they
commit to budget support or otherwise embrace the Medium Term Expenditure
Framework as the organising principle. Increasingly, they will need to become
comfortable not only with issues of budget composition, as previously, but also on the
stance of fiscal policy. For example, if the Fund is no longer insisting on a particular
number for the budget deficit, so that this is not pre-empted from consideration by
anyone else, it becomes a matter for choice and dialogue, and will involve weighing up
alternatives. In the past, even though some of donors adopted positions critical of Fund
recommendations, it was nonetheless possible for them and, to an extent, the
government to abdicate from the issue of choosing the macroeconomic stance of the
budget. The relative non-negotiability of the IMF’s position—often fully justified by a
lack of real room for macroeconomic manoeuvre—pre-empted the macro policy debate.
In light of the changes noted above, a broader dialogue is now required.
Long run development goals and institutional changes
The third reason is that donors, international institutions, and in many cases
governments have recently articulated their objectives much more clearly than hitherto,
so that most policy components and aid initiatives are to be assessed against their
contribution to poverty reduction and growth. This refocusing of objectives has been
accompanied by changes to the instruments relating aid flows to the policies of the
recipient governments. While different countries are at different stages in the process,
the intention is that the key document will be the government’s Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP), which will replace the Policy Framework Paper (PFP). Unlike
the PFP, which was often supposed to have been drafted in Washington, it is intended
that the PRSP be ‘produced by the country authorities…in a transparent process
involving broad participation, including representatives of the poor’ (IMF 2000a).
Given a satisfactory PRSP, the Fund will then provide support through the Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), the successor to the Extended Structural
Adjustment Facility (ESAF). The main features of PRGF-supported programmes must
be seen to be drawn from the country’s PRSP. Similarly, the World Bank will base its
lending around the programme embodied in the PRSP, and has introduced a new
instrument, the Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) which can provide associated
budgetary support. Other aid flows, such as those arising from the enhanced HIPC
provisions for debt reduction, and much of that provided bilaterally by donors, will also
reflect the provisions of the PRSP. The preferred vehicle for implementing the
macro/budgetary aspects of the programme remains the Medium Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF) (see Foster and Fozzard 2001).
This renewed emphasis on poverty reduction and growth is taken to include fiscal
policy. The primary role of fiscal policy remains that of maintaining a stable macro
economy, since it is accepted that macroeconomic instability is generally bad for growth
and for the poor. Within the set of fiscal policies that are consistent with achievement of
that primary target, choice should emphasise poverty reduction and growth. However
the links between (sustainable) alternative fiscal policies and changes in poverty or
growth are not well understood.3
The upshot of these three related developments is that fiscal policy choices are not only
on the agenda in a way they were not a few years ago, but also that they need to be
analysed thoroughly, since their consequences for the outcomes of interest are not clear-
cut. This paper examines some aspects of these choices in the case of countries where
stabilisation has been achieved or is otherwise not a problem. This still leaves an
important distinction between those countries which have only recently achieved
stabilisation following a period of severe instability (such as triple digit inflation), and
those which either have had a reasonably extended period of adjustment following
stabilisation, or had never suffered from severe instability in the first place. The former
group will face a transition period during which the system’s stocks (for example,
foreign exchange reserves and real money balances) remain at disequilibrium levels for
a time even when the flows have been brought under control. The flows (for example,
the domestic budget deficit after grants) must then be chosen in a way that permits
appropriate stock adjustment. The latter group will have the relative luxury of stocks
near their equilibrium values and so will have greater discretion over the level at which
flows can be set. For convenience, we refer to the first circumstance as ‘post
stabilisation’ and the second as ‘post-post stabilisation’.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the evolution of fiscal and
related magnitudes in a range of developing countries between the mid 1980s and the
late 1990s, paying particular attention to the low-income economies of Sub-Saharan
Africa. Section 3 then discusses fiscal issues, which are specific to the post-stabilisation
phase, that is to say those associated with stock imbalances and private sector
demoralisation. Section 4 turns to post-post stabilisation issues, that is to say those
which are relatively permanent features of fiscal management, such as any trade-offs
between growth, inflation and poverty reduction, and the design of flexibility, for
example in response to shocks. Section 5 discusses the mechanisms for implementing
policy, including the cash budget and what may be introduced to succeed it. Section 6
concludes.
2 Fiscal characteristics of low-income stabilising countries
In order to appreciate the specific characteristics of low-income post-stabilisation
economies we examine the evolution of the principal fiscal variables in these countries
both during and after stabilisation and compare this pattern with that experienced by
other developing countries. Table 1 provides summary evidence on key fiscal stocks
and flows for a range of countries during the late 1980s and 1990s. Countries are
classified into four groups. The first two groups comprise countries which have
successfully undergone aggressive price-stabilisation aimed at eliminating chronically,
and often exceptionally, high rates of inflation. These two groups constitute 32 separate
stabilisation episodes, specific details of which are provided in Appendix Table 1. Of
these, 12 are in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5 from other low- income countries. The
remaining 15 are middle-income economies, particularly those in Latin America and4
Table 1. Stock-flow characteristics of stabilisation episodes
Annual Change during Stabilisation Control Group
High - Inflation High - Inflation Low-Inflation
Low-Income Countries Middle-Income Countries African Economies
Median duration of stabilisation 4y e a r s 3y e a r s
Inflation -15.58% -21.83% -0.42%
Primary Budget Balance (% GDP) 0.34% 0.47% 0.09%
Overall Budget Balance after grants (% GDP) 0.13% 0.30% -0.92%
ODA (% GDP) -0.03% -0.05% -0.41%
Domestic Debt (% GDP) -0.54% n.a. 2.03%




External Debt Service (% GDP) -0.43% -0.05% -0.28%
Foreign Reserves (% GDP) 0.51% 0.25% 0.81%
Money, M2 (% GDP) -0.63% -0.01% 0.12%
Dom Credit to Govt (% GDP) -0.75% -1.38% 0.23%
Dom Credit to Pri. Sec (%
GDP)
-0.48% 0.21% 0.08%
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) -0.04% 0.20% 0.08%
Post-Stabilisation Characteristics
Low-Income Countries Middle-Income Countrues Control Groups
At Stabilisation At Stabilisation Low-Inflation Low & Middle
Stabilisation plus 5 years Stabilisation plus 5 years African
Economies
Income DCs
Annual Inflation 9.6% 10.0% 13.4% 7.1% 7.8% 7.2%
Primary Budget Balance (% GDP) -1.3% -1.1% 2.2% 4.0% -2.1% -1.8%
Overall Budget Balance after grants (%
GDP)
-3.0% -2.9% -0.7% -1.0% -3.8% -2.3%
ODA (% GDP) 18.0% 12.6% 1.3% 0.7% 7.4% 1.1%
Domestic Debt (% GDP) 4.5% 6.3% n.a. n.a. 32.2% 53.0%
Domestic Interest (% GDP) 1.1% 2.0% 1.5% 1.4% 1.0% n.a.
External Debt (% GDP) 95.8% 80.8% 40.2% 39.0% 87.3% 64.0%
External Debt Service (& GDP 4.1% 2.0% 3.8% 5.5% 2.1% 5.7%
Foreign Reserves (% GDP) 7.1% 8.9% 10.6% 13.0% 5.6% 12.0%
Money, M2 (% GDP) 11.2% 11.2% 29.7% 35.5% 20.7% 44.0%
Dom Credit to Govt (% GDP) 5.4% 11.5% 7.7% 6.2% 2.3% 16.0%
Dom Credit to Pri. Sec (% GDP) 5.7% 10.1% 27.1% 33.5% 17.0% 29.0%
Total Tax Revenue (% GDP) 12.2% 12.2% 15.9% 15.5% 26.7% 24.0%
Memo Items:
Inflation rate prior to stabilisation 83.0% 128.0% 15.0%
Average GDP growth prior to
stabilisation
1.5% 3.3%
Post-stabilisation GDP growth 3.6% 3.7% 2.6% 3.1%
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators 2001
Notes: [1] Data reported in this table are derived from Appendix Table 1. Changes (top panel) and stock
and flow levels (bottom panel) are unweighted sample medians
[2] The changes in Inflation (top panel) is expressed in percentage points. All other changes and
levels expressed in percentage points of GDP
[3] The sample for the control groups is 1980-1998 (see also Footnote 3 in text—p. 5)
[4] Because of aggregation across countries, implict balance sheet constraints (for example the
domestic monetary survey) do not necessarily hold.
[5] Pre-stabilisation growth computed over 5 years prior to start of stabilisation episode
[6] n.a. denotes data not available5
the Caribbean.2 Two control groups are also identified. The first is a set of African
countries which have enjoyed relatively low inflation over the last two decades,3 and
the second consists of a set of 57 other low- and middle-income countries (excluding
those counted elsewhere).
In this paper our interests lie principally with the group of ‘successful’ stabilisers, those
countries which have restored price stability starting from a position of severe
macroeconomic disequilibrium, in which price instability frequently represented a threat
to the economy as a whole. This category is of relevance not only because it includes
many countries where the question of fiscal management is the subject of active debate,
but also because the experiences of this group of countries trace out plausible
trajectories for a number of other countries still in a state of macroeconomic instability
such as Zimbabwe and Nigeria. Included in the group of successful stabilisers are a set
of well-known high or hyperinflation economies—Nicaragua at the end of the 1980s,
Ghana in the early 1980s, and Uganda, Mozambique, Sudan, Sierre Leone and Zambia
in the early 1990s, all of which managed to bring inflation down from triple-digit levels
in a short period of time. But the group also includes countries where the initial inflation
was lower but where stabilisation efforts were directed towards the elimination of
chronic but relatively moderate official inflation rates, often in cases where price and
other controls served to repress domestic inflation. This latter group includes countries
such as Tanzania, Kenya, the Gambia, Honduras, and Guinea.
As Appendix I clearly illustrates, our data necessarily embrace an extremely large range
of experience, reflecting both differences in the origins of the economic crises
precipitating stabilisation, and the political and institutional context against which the
stabilisation efforts took place. Thus our data set includes countries in which economic
crisis can be traced to external trade or climatic shocks, to domestic policy failures, or to
conflict. However, it is not our intention to examine either the origins or the particular
anatomy of stabilisation episodes. Rather, our concern is with the legacy of stabilisation
and its implications for post-stabilisation policy choices. In this respect the data suggest
a number of important stylised facts.
Consider first the actual process of stabilisation, which is reported in the top half of
Table 1. The first important feature to note is the fundamental link between the budget,
its financing, and inflation. Although the relationship is non-linear, inflation control has
typically been associated with a sharp reduction in domestic credit to the government, in
the order of 0.75 percent of GDP per annum during the stabilisation period amongst
low-income stabilisers and 1.4 percent of GDP per annum in middle-income stabilisers.
In a number of countries where the stock of credit to government was already low, such
as Haiti, Mozambique and Tanzania, the squeeze has been even larger, averaging closer
to 2.0 percent of GDP per annum. A number of factors have helped finance this
contraction in credit, most notably an improvement in the primary fiscal balance, which
2 ‘Successful’ stabilisation episodes consist of all countries which have seen domestic price inflation
fall from high levels to rates less than 15 percent per annum, where the latter are sustained for at least
two years, and for which there exist sufficient data on key fiscal aggregates. Data limitations mean
that the set excludes a number of stabilisations experienced by transition economies as well as in Laos
and Cambodia.
3 This group consists of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia (1985-
94), Liberia (1980-89), Mauritius and the Seychelles.6
increased by 0.3 percent of GDP per annum in low income countries and almost 0.5
percent per annum for middle-income stabilisers. This adjustment to the primary
balance was accompanied on average by a modest increase in domestic revenue
generation in middle-income countries but by a slight fall in low-income countries,
implying a significant role for expenditure reduction in achieving stabilisation. Just how
significant this adjustment in public expenditure was can be seen if we compare the
experience of the low-income countries with the first control group, those (African)
economies which, for whatever reason, managed to maintain a fair degree of fiscal
control over the 1980s and 1990s. Relieved of the need to lean heavily on fiscal policy
levers, this group enjoyed a looser overall fiscal stance (funded in part by a slight
increase in the tax yield, higher domestic borrowing, and by higher external assistance),
and at the same time a modest ‘crowding-in’ of credit to the private sector.
The withdrawal of government from the domestic credit market during stabilisation has
not, in general, been accompanied by a crowding-in of credit to the private sector,
which rather has been squeezed on two fronts, particularly in low-income countries. On
the one hand the legacy of high and variable inflation, combined frequently with
financial liberalisation, has reduced the private sector’s willingness to hold domestic
money. Real money demand fell on average by 0.6 percent of GDP per annum during
stabilisation in low income countries (but by notably less in middle-income countries).
On the other hand, stabilisation episodes have seen governments re-building their net
international reserves, by around 0.5 percent and 0.25 percent of GDP per annum in
low- and middle-income countries respectively. The net effect of the decline in the
demand for money and an increase in net foreign assets has been an offsetting reduction
in total domestic credit available to the economy. Thus despite the reduction in the
public sector use of domestic credit, credit to the private sector also fell, particularly in
low-income stabilising economies where the absolute volume of credit going to the
private sector fell by an average of 0.5 percent of GDP per annum through the
stabilisation process.
What is more important from the perspective of this paper is the state in which countries
undertaking stabilisation exited from the stabilisation phase. This is summarized in the
bottom panel of Table 1 that details the immediate ‘post-stabilisation’ fiscal
configuration and, in the case of the stabilising economies, the configuration five years
after price stability had been achieved (where data are available to do so). Again a
number of common themes can be identified. Overall, stabilising economies have
emerged from the period of fiscal contraction with a relatively tight fiscal stance and,
for the low-income countries at least, a marked recovery in average GDP growth. For
low-income stabilisers the overall budget deficit averages around 3 percent of GDP and
is sustained in large measure by high levels of concessional aid flows.4 For middle-
income economies with less access to concessional development assistance the fiscal
balance is tighter by around two percentage points of GDP
The key feature of the post stabilisation configuration is, arguably, the disposition of the
stocks of aggregate assets and liabilities. On the basis of our data it would appear that
low-income economies emerge from stabilisation with low levels of domestic debt; high
net external liabilities (i.e. external debt net of reserves); low levels of monetisation; and
4 The lack of accurate of data on domestic debt makes it difficult to fully reconcile reported stocks and
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hence limited domestic credit to the private sector, even though domestic credit to the
government is relatively tightly reined in. Importantly, these stock positions are low
relative not only to their own history, as implied by the top panel of Table 1, but also
relative to those African economies that have enjoyed more gradualist stabilisation
experiences, relative to middle income stabilisers, and also relative to other low- and
middle-income countries outside Africa. Thus although inflation has been brought in
line with rates experienced elsewhere in Africa, and the domestic tax effort edged up
marginally during stabilisation, domestic revenue rates, the demand for money, and
domestic credit to the private sector remain exceptionally low, at levels that are less
than half the level enjoyed by other African economies, and as little as a quarter of the
levels enjoyed in other low- and middle income countries
Moreover, as the (admittedly limited) data presented in columns 2 and 4 of the lower
panel suggest, despite having successfully tackled high inflation, the recovery of key
asset stocks in the post-stabilisation phase is unlikely to be as rapid. Although the time-
span of our data is typically short, a consistent message emerges: although our set of
‘successful stabilisers’ have sustained reasonable low-inflation growth post-
stabilisation, neither domestic resource mobilisation nor domestic asset stocks (of the
government, the private sector, and the banking sector) have recovered in the post-
stabilisation period to any measurable degree so that the post-stabilisation ‘gap’ remains
wide even after a sustained period of fiscal control. Reaching the post-post-stabilisation
phase appears to be a very protracted business.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine the reasons for the persistence of this low
post-stabilisation stock configuration and consider the implications this has for the
conduct of fiscal policy in a post-stabilisation phase.
3 The post-stabilisation phase
We begin by considering a country that has recently emerged from an extended period
of severe disequilibrium, the government having brought the budget under control, and
reduced inflation, let us say, to a single digit rate. As noted in the introduction, there are
likely to be a variety of stock and other consequences that will take time to correct, and
which will limit fiscal policy options in the short run. There are seven major (related)
categories of ‘hangover’ to consider. They are the levels of domestic and external
government debt; the partitioning of domestic credit between the private sector and the
government; the level of foreign exchange reserves; the private sector’s demand for real
money balances; the state of the private sector in respect of confidence, entrepreneurial
capacity, and institutional capacity; and the capacity of the government itself to spend
productively. While the impact of these factors on fiscal policy is likely to be
intertwined, it is helpful to consider them sequentially.
External debt
For the large class of highly indebted poor countries, the financing of external debt
service is a major issue. Either the government must run unacceptably high domestic
primary surpluses, or a major part of the current gross aid inflow is pre-empted to
service the debt. The HIPC initiative is designed to reduce external debt to a level that is8
deemed sustainable relative to some indicator of capacity to pay (GDP, exports or
government revenue). Since the nominal value of debt is a poor indicator of the debt
service burden (because of varying degrees of concessionality), the present value
calculated at some benchmark set of discount rates is used instead. The intention is to
maintain the gross inflow in face of debt reduction, so that the net inflow is enhanced.
There has been some dispute about how this enhanced inflow should be used, whether
to reduce the government’s domestic debt, or to raise government spending in the social
sectors. The third possibility, that of permitting a reduction in domestic tax effort, has
rarely been treated as a serious option as concerns about the adverse (permanent) effects
on domestic tax effort have tended to outweigh counter arguments concerning the
distortionary effects of high domestic taxes. In any event, the stock adjustment problem
implied by the excessive level of external debt is universally perceived to be an issue for
the international community to resolve, not the domestic government through its own
budgetary process.
However, it is less commonly understood or accepted that the revaluation of debt stocks
in present value terms should logically imply a comparable redefinition of the budget
deficit. Current practice is to distinguish between the deficit before and after grants, and
the latter has increasingly been seen as more appropriate for countries which will
effectively rely on grants and concessional finance into the long term (see Stiglitz
1998). However, just as the stock of concessional debt can be split into its implicit grant
and market loan components (as in the HIPC present value calculation), so can the
current flow of loans. A measure of the budget deficit can then be calculated after
‘augmented’ grants, i.e. grants plus the grant element in soft loans. The effect on the
numbers may be quite substantial. For example, over the next three years in Uganda, the
deficit before grants is projected to average 8.9 percent of GDP, that after grants 2.5
percent. However, the net inflow of loans is projected to average 3.5 percent. If, for
illustration, we assume a grant element of 70 percent in these loans then the deficit after
augmented grants would be zero (70 percent of 3.5 = 2.5). Since discussions of fiscal
prudence so often centre on the size of the deficit, it is important to ensure that the most
appropriate measure (or set of measures) is used.
Domestic debt
Whereas the external debt of low-income countries is typically high relative to GDP, the
position in respect of domestic debt is much more varied. In some cases, the level is low
and there is no need to reduce it; of course, this may itself reflect a history of high
inflation. In other cases, it is high, and the level of domestic debt service is also a
problem. Frequently, this difficulty was concealed by financial repression which kept
the domestic interest rate below market levels. The problem then became acute during
the process of financial liberalisation. A particularly striking example of this effect was
seen in Zimbabwe during the early 1990s. Throughout the 1980s the government had
financed a large fiscal deficit through the sale of domestic debt at highly repressed
interest rates. The liberalization of interest rates in 1991, in circumstances of a
continued lack of fiscal control, saw domestic interest costs increase by almost 5 percent
of GDP in the space of three years, as the government rolled over the large domestic
debt stock at very high domestic interest rates (see, for example, IMF 1998).
In a post-inflationary situation in a closed economy, the only way to reduce domestic
debt is to run a budget surplus by increasing domestic revenue and/or reducing9
expenditure. However, in an open economy, domestic debt can be reduced without
impacting on these domestic magnitudes, either by incurring more external debt—
necessarily in a concessional form under the HIPC rules—or, preferably, by an
increased flow of external grants. Thus the implications of excessive domestic
government debt for fiscal policy depend on whether there exist willing donors who will
finance the reduction. Of course, under the usual accounting rules, the domestic budget
will be by-passed by the external financing if this takes the form of loans, but will
record a domestic surplus if it takes the form of grants.
Domestic credit
A previous history of fiscal indiscipline, directed credit, and financial repression is
likely to have left as a legacy a very unbalanced use of domestic credit, with the private
sector having been crowded out by the public sector. It will then be necessary for the
public sector substantially to withdraw, permitting increased access to the private sector.
There will not be a one-to-one relation in this process, because the total volume of
domestic credit is not fixed. In particular, it will change over time in conjunction with
the evolution of the demand for money and the rate at which foreign exchange reserves
are rebuilt. The position may be further complicated by the need to write off bad debts
incurred by parastatals, and to re-capitalise parts of the banking system (including the
central bank). In addition, while it is emerging from an extended period of financial
repression, the banking system will often be poorly equipped in the skills of risk
assessment. It may therefore be difficult to sustain a rapid expansion of credit to the
private sector without sacrificing prudence. If the government organises a very rapid
reduction in its use of credit, this may therefore lead not to a correspondingly rapid rise
in private credit, but to a reduction in the total. It is then possible that the laudable
objective of making room for a resurgent private sector may actually inhibit the
recovery, by reducing government demand without replacing this with private demand.
Foreign exchange reserves
Once again, these may be at a severely depleted level in the immediate post-stabilisation
phase. There are two issues, one being the choice of an appropriate target level, and the
other being the speed at which reserves are re-built to this target level.
The target is usually expressed in months of imports, with four or five months being
typical. Using import value as a base may seem logical, since foreign exchange reserves
could be used to buy imports, and we might envisage a scenario where there was a
temporary interruption to exports or aid receipts, and would wish to use reserves to
cover imports during the interval. The appropriate level would then depend on the likely
scale and frequency of these interruptions, coupled with a calculation as to the relative
costs of managing them by tying up resources in the form of reserves, as opposed to
fluctuations in the exchange rate (and consequently in the flow of goods). From this
perspective, and on the most casual basis, the 4-5 month target seems plausible.
However, the case for using imports as the scaling factor may not be so overwhelming
as appears at first sight. They are clearly there to provide accommodation, either in
response to unforeseen events, or to relatively predictable volatility. However, in
practice, their role may be more to insulate domestic monetary and budgetary policy
from aid and domestic revenue volatility than the flow of imports from export10
volatility.5 When anticipated revenue and aid inflows do not materialise, or do not
materialise on time, the government faces a choice. It could (temporarily) cut
expenditures, with all that that would imply for disruption and ultimately increased
costs. Or it could allow its deficit to increase, and find a way of financing this. Low-
income countries typically have little capacity to vary the non-bank financing of
government in the short term, so financing will have to found within the monetary
system. If we rule out the expedient of an inflationary increase in the money supply, or
any renewed attempt to pre-empt private sector access to credit, this can only be
achieved by running down foreign exchange reserves. From this perspective, the real
value of these reserves is to permit government to finance the revenue shortfall caused
either by delays in donor disbursements or in domestic collections, rather than to guard
against instability in export earnings. The most appropriate scaling factor would then be
government expenditure rather than imports.
Whatever the target, it will be necessary to decide how rapidly it should be achieved.
This will involve balancing the risks of inadequate cover against the costs of reduced
levels of other desirable activities, such as concurrent expenditures or the adjustment of
other stock imbalances, for example excess domestic debt. In IMF programmes in the
recent past, the appropriate horizon was often taken to be 2-4 years. In other words,
reserves were to be built up at the rate of 1-2 months of imports per annum. Of course,
in an economy undergoing real growth, and especially if this were accompanied by
rapid increases in imports (due both to increased aid flows and increased openness), this
would all be relative to a moving target.
Demand for real balances
It is a central tenet of monetary economics that the demand for real balances will
decline in the face of inflation, and this is well substantiated by the evidence. There is in
consequence an expectation that this demand will recover during the post–stabilisation
phase. What is much less clear is the dynamics of this relationship. In particular, how
long will it take for demand to recover following a successful and sustained
disinflation? The evidence here suggests that the recovery is likely to be very long-
drawn out and may be unpredictable. It does however potentially offer quite substantial
opportunities for enhanced seigniorage in the medium run. For example, the demand for
money in Uganda fell very substantially during the civil war and the associated triple
digit inflation. Stabilisation was followed by a slow—and in this case fairly steady—
recovery, worth about three-quarters of one per cent of GDP per annum. Failing to
allow for this recovery would have meant that monetary policy was substantially more
disinflationary than intended. This is the analogue of the possible disinflation associated
with the attempted realignment of domestic credit discussed earlier.
There is a cautionary note to be entered here. The retreat from domestic currency during
an extended episode of high inflation may be partly irreversible. Part of it may represent
a conventional (and costly) process of economising on liquidity, which will be reversed
when it is believed that it is safe to do so. The issue is then largely one of policy
credibility. But another part may represent substitution of other means of payment, for
5 Bleaney et al. (1995) argue that revenue instability is significantly higher in low-income countries
than in more developed economies and is particularly severe in Sub-Saharan Africa.11
example by dollarisation of transactions. Once private agents have invested in the
necessary know-how and currency stocks, these alternatives may remain perfectly
viable after the inflation rate has been reduced. There would now be no incentive to
adopt these alternatives, but there is no incentive to abandon them either.
The state of the private sector
The initial, post-stabilisation configuration of the private sector is also an important
determinant of fiscal policy options. This has already been a recurrent theme in the
discussion of money demand and domestic credit. But there is the more general issue of
the state of the private sector, and its capacity rapidly to make use of the post-
stabilisation opportunities offered it. A major component of the conventional wisdom of
the last couple of decades is that for improved performance of the real economy, and in
particular growth, it will be necessary to rely on the private sector. The role of
government is to be restricted to provision of an appropriate ‘enabling environment’ and
of suitable human and physical infrastructure. Given this type of policy stance, there
may be an extended and uncomfortable period while a private sector which has become
demoralised and unaccustomed to dealing with market forces gets its act together. This
period may be particularly extended in post-conflict environments where basic market
institutions are likely to take longer to recover (Addison and Murshed 2001).
There are likely to be a number of ways in which governments can respond to these
difficulties, for example by ensuring that information and advisory services are widely
available. It will also be important to maximise policy credibility, possibly by some pre-
commitment devices. But realistically there is likely to be a recovery phase in which the
private sector occupies less ‘economic space’ than it would in a more equilibrium
configuration. The balance between government expenditures and any associated deficit
financing may be struck differently during such a phase than they will be subsequently.
Absorptive capacity
Running in the opposite direction to the previous point is the possibility that the
government itself has low capacity, following a period when it had become distanced
from its primary functions, including those as a service provider. Indeed this has often
been the express rationale of NGOs in setting out to provide public services via parallel
systems rather than through the budget and via the public sector itself. In turn, this
response has often exacerbated the problem, starving the public sector provider of funds
and simultaneously setting up a better-resourced and more credible alternative. The
consequence of these developments is that the public sector not only has been under-
resourced but also that its capacity to use additional resources has become
compromised. In the short-term, these problems of public sector capacity may be
exacerbated in a number of countries by the process of rapid decentralisation of
responsibility for social services. There is therefore the possibility that the limit on what
can fruitfully be spent in some sectors is limited more by absorptive capacity than by
available resources. In that case, there is a risk that incremental resources will be
wasted. While this is clearly conceivable, it seems more appropriate to respond to it if
there is evidence that it is happening, rather than pre-empt the problem ex ante by
withholding funds against the possibility that it might.12
Summary
There are three principal points to note about this discussion of issues. First, the severity
of these various legacies from the past is likely to vary substantially between countries.
Second, in varying degrees, they will require early and systematic attention. In
consequence, fiscal policy in the post-stabilisation phase is likely to be heavily
conditioned by the country’s specific legacy and may differ markedly between
countries. Third, the issues of growth and poverty reduction have not featured explicitly
in the discussion. Of course, any rectification of problems that opens up the range of
future policy options has considerable implicit relevance for achieving these goals. But
the direct connection between these goals and the post-stabilisation restrictions
discussed here appears to be slight.
4 The post-post-stabilisation phase
The issues discussed in the previous section will be resolved at very different rates. So,
for example, the initial imbalance in foreign exchange reserves is likely to have been
rectified within a very few years of stabilisation, while full recovery in the demand for
money might take a decade. Thus the transition between these two phases is likely itself
to be protracted. For purposes of exposition, we ignore this complication and proceed to
consider an economy for which none of the preceding seven issues remains a serious
problem. Hence, fiscal choices can be made in the light of long run rather than short-run
considerations. Since the economy is certainly going to continue changing over time,
these considerations are still dynamic rather than static ones, but in many cases these
can usefully be thought of in a context of (more or less) balanced growth. In this
section, we examine five of these; the target level of domestic revenue mobilisation; the
composition of government spending; the target inflation rate; the associated domestic
financing; and the problem of fiscal shocks. Two assumptions are made about aid
inflows. First, it assumed that the level of concessional aid flows available to the
country is non-negotiable (though it clearly might vary in response, for example, to a
perceived decline in the quality of policy). Second, it is assumed that absorptive
capacity is not a problem, so that all available aid should be accepted.
Domestic revenue mobilisation
During recent decades, a powerful consensus has developed as to the appropriate design
of tax systems and other devices for generating government revenues (Heady 2001).
This has included not only the structure of taxes, but also the level of tax rates. This
conventional wisdom is probably pretty soundly based, and so to refuse to subscribe to
it would be imprudent as well as incurring disapproval from the International Financial
Institutions. There also appears to be a consensus that this structure should lead to
revenues on the order of 15-20 percent of GDP. Remarkably enough, however, very
similar tax structures and tax rates seem to generate very different revenues in different
countries. The reason presumably lies in different levels of taxpayer compliance and of
the efficiency of tax administration, and this is where a government’s discretion to
increase revenue mainly lies.
Some of the most salient recent examples of successful stabilisation have been poor
performers relative to the conventional benchmark (for example, both Uganda and13
Tanzania at 11-12 percent of GDP). Since another conventional assumption is that
government expenditure in low-income countries should reach 20 percent of GDP or so,
this raises a major issue. Will donors be prepared to find the missing 8-9 percent of
GDP into the long haul? If not, how can domestic revenue be raised, by how much and
over what time-scale? If a sufficient increase can be achieved by improved
administration and a broadening of the tax base, this might not be too damaging. But if
it can only be achieved by substantial rate rises on the existing, often narrow, tax base
with a continuing inefficient administration, the increasingly distortionary tax structure
might be severely inimical to growth. However, if donors progressively withdraw from
the very high current rate of supplementation of government resources, and there is no
improvement in domestic revenues, a severe squeeze on spending will ensue. Unless
social sector spending can be ring-fenced in the face of severe aggregate cuts, poverty
reduction is likely to be seriously compromised.
Composition of government spending
At first sight, this appears to be the area in which local discretion and participation
would have their clearest purchase. However, in practice it has become in part a donor
prerogative. In some cases, there appears to be common ground between the two groups
in the wish to shift the composition of spending towards the social sectors and other
categories perceived to be pro-poor, such as infrastructure spending on water supply and
rural roads. In other cases there is more of a tension. When donors are financing a large
proportion of total expenditures, it would be too much to hope that their compositional
preferences would always coincide with local wishes—or indeed that either group of
preferences would even be internally coherent. Nor is it reasonable to expect donors to
abdicate from any responsibility as to how their funds are spent. In consequence, the
process of arriving at the composition of spending is necessarily a political process,
involving a certain amount of horse-trading. What is crucial is that this be done in a
reasonably coherent and transparent way; sequential dialogues over the poverty
reduction strategy paper, culminating in agreement of a medium term expenditure
framework, seem to offer sufficient scope for this. However it is very important for all
the major donors to buy into this process and to live with it subsequently. This implies
an incomplete form of local ownership, and a three way participatory process.
It is at the level of budget composition that the relationship between budgets and
poverty reduction is most apparent. The conventional wisdom is that poverty reduction
is best served by shifting resources from other sectors, such as defence and general
administration, towards the social sectors, especially primary education and primary
health care, and towards certain types of infrastructure provision, such as rural roads
and water supply. This is intuitively appealing, but it has to be said that the evidence is
somewhat mixed, and it is worth sounding a few cautionary notes. For example, the
extensive efforts at consultation with rural inhabitants in Uganda, during preparation of
the current poverty eradication action programme, revealed that concerns about
insecurity were central to their perceptions of the causes of poverty (Government of
Uganda 2000). Similarly, it is widely believed that both corruption and difficulties in
enforcing contracts retard growth and hence poverty reduction, but the fight to rectify
these defects is likely to require increased spending on administration (to improve
monitoring and audit) and legal institutions such as courts. At the other extreme, little
poverty impact is achieved by increasing the drug budget for the health system if drugs
are routinely sold on illegally by corrupt employees. Hence it may be more difficult
than popularly supposed to identify sectors or line items in the budget that have especial
leverage on poverty.14
The target inflation rate
The target rate of inflation is fundamental to the macroeconomic framework. Even
setting aside the operational issue of how the authorities go about hitting a target for the
inflation rate, the prior question of what that rate should be has generated extensive
debate. However, the evidence on this point is actually relatively clear and entirely
consistent with intuition. Since this section focuses on a situation where high inflation
has already been removed from the system, it does not explore the dynamics of
disinflation, but restricts attention to two issues. The first concerns the relationship
between inflation and aggregate economic growth over the medium term, and the
second concerns whether the inflation-growth trade-off is characterised by particular
distributional biases. Specifically, are there points on the trade-off where lower
aggregate growth is compensated for by higher growth amongst the poor?
On the first issue, the consensus evidence from cross-country data is strong (see Ghosh
and Phillips 1998). The key point is that for very low values of inflation (i.e. less than
3 percent per annum) higher inflation is associated with higher growth, reflecting the
fact that very low rates of inflation limit the scope for efficient relative price and real
wage adjustment. Above this level of inflation, and certainly by the time inflation
reaches double digits, the relationship is negative: higher inflation is associated with
lower growth, but at a reducing rate. This convexity in the relationship6 implies that the
inflation-growth trade off is at its most severe in the region of chronic moderate
inflation of between 10 percent-40 percent per annum. These empirical estimates of the
inflation-growth trade off appear to be robust in the relevant dimensions. Even allowing
for some variation around the central point estimates, we can say with a fair degree of
confidence that the growth-maximising rate of inflation will lie somewhere in range of
5 percent to 10 percent per annum for developing countries.
These figures hold for average growth only. A natural question is whether there is a
systematic pro- or anti-poor bias associated with inflation and its trade-off with growth.
Although this issue has been examined less extensively in the literature, there is a strong
consensus that higher inflation is at least as costly to the poor as it is to other sections of
the population, reflecting mainly the lesser ability of the poor to protect their factor
incomes and asset portfolios from the effects of inflation. At the least, there is nothing
to suggest that targeting a low rate of inflation for macroeconomic policy reasons would
be contra-indicated when the interests of the poor are taken into account.
Deficits and domestic financing
For low-income countries that are constrained in their access to international finance,
the overall budget balance is not of great interest. What matters is the decomposition
into its external and domestic components. The external deficit (absorptive capacity
issues apart) should consist only of concessional finance and, broadly, should be as
large as the providers of concessional finance are prepared to make it. The domestic
deficit (once the underlying stocks have been equilibrated) is a different matter. The
appropriate level will reflect the target values of the three other macroeconomic
6 This implies that the proportional reduction in the average growth rate is greater for an increase in
inflation from 10 percent to 20 percent, say, than for an increase in inflation from 70 percent to 80
percent.15
magnitudes with which it is tied in the monetary balance sheet. Specifically, the
government will have a target rate of growth of nominal money that will be consistent
with the target inflation rate, given the forecast growth in real income and any
anticipated changes in the velocity of circulation. Second, it will have a target increase
in the domestic currency value of foreign exchange reserves, consistent with the
projected growth in the dollar value of imports and any anticipated movement in the
exchange rate. Third, it will have a target for the increase in domestic credit to the
private sector, consistent with the projected expansion of that sector and its associated
financing requirements. This essentially leaves the government’s recourse to domestic
credit as a residual. Since its ability to place longer-term interest bearing debt is
typically very limited, at least at the margin, there is little scope to set the domestic
deficit independently. Of course, if this ‘residual’ approach produces outcomes for
government spending which are unacceptable, the other target values will need to be
revisited.
Coping with revenue shocks
The preceding paragraph sketched how the government’s fiscal stance might be
determined ex ante, on the basis of best projections and judgement. In practice, low-
income countries face unusually high resource volatility, both in the domestic revenue
component and in the net aid inflow. They are also relatively poorly equipped to cope
with it, given their lack of financial depth. These features are very likely to continue
long into the post-post-stabilisation phase. One extreme response, embodied in the
strictest form of the cash budget, discussed in the next section, is simply to maintain
budget balance by forcing aggregate expenditure to fluctuate with revenue. However,
this is extremely costly to the delivery of services, so ways of smoothing expenditure
are important. If donors are unable to help by providing (external) compensating
finance—and indeed they are often a major part of the problem—then this
accommodation has to be found internally. Given the tenderness of a financially narrow
system to large swings in purely domestic financing, foreign exchange reserves may
have a serious role. If so, their target level needs to be set with this role in mind, as
noted earlier.
5 Policy implementation
Institutions of fiscal policy management should be capable of fulfilling a number of
functions. The first is the ex ante function of tracking and coordinating resource flows
to the government (from taxation, aid, and domestic financing) and aligning them with
expenditure priorities within a sustainable macroeconomic framework which balances
the benefits of public sector expenditure with the costs of resource mobilisation from
the domestic private sector and donor community. A second is the ex post function of
revenue and expenditure tracking and control, required to allow the authorities to
identify and respond to changes in domestic revenue and aid flows or other
eventualities. Finally, in harness with monetary policy institutions, in particular the
central bank, budgetary institutions can play an important political role, signalling in a
transparent fashion the stance of public policy to both donors and the domestic private
sector, and thereby serving as an effective agency of restraint on discretionary
behaviour.16
In Sub-Saharan Africa, and particularly amongst those countries with a history of high
and persistent inflation, new budgetary institutions have emerged in recent year as a
direct response to the over-riding need to reduce the domestic budget deficit. Hence, the
emphasis has tended to be on meeting the second, control, function noted above. Thus
we have seen the emergence in a number of countries such as Zambia, Tanzania,
Uganda and Mozambique, of highly restrictive budgetary mechanisms with a very
short-run focus, often tightly linked to IMF ESAF or Rights Accumulation Programmes,
at the expense of broader-based institutions capable of articulating the wider resource
mobilisation and allocation objectives of government. More sophisticated budgetary
institutions have been limited, in the main, to countries with a history of low inflation
and the luxury of long fiscal horizons—the prime example being Botswana where
rolling medium term budgetary frameworks have been a feature of the public policy
landscape since the mid 1960s.
Given the severe fiscal disequilibrium in which such countries found themselves, this
focus on short-run fiscal deficit reduction was entirely correct. Institutions such as rule-
based cash budgets have proved to be successful in reducing inflation. For example, in
Zambia the authorities adopted cash-budget rules which essentially ‘zero-based’ public
expenditure: no expenditure was possible without the accumulation of sufficient
revenue to finance it. The cash budget was enforced by denying line-or spending
ministries direct access to the central bank overdraft facilities, effectively placing
ministries and government as a whole on a cash-in-advance constraint subject to the
overall control by the Ministry of Finance. These mechanisms, binding government to a
balanced domestic budget (and hence limiting the growth in the monetary base) in the
face of high and rising inflation, reflected the diagnosis that inflation was symptomatic
of a lack of fiscal discipline and a tendency for opportunistic fiscal behaviour. This was
also the diagnosis in Uganda, which adopted a somewhat more flexible system, the
‘cash flow’, which permitted a greater degree of within-year smoothing, while still
being designed to maintain detailed control of monthly releases and ensure that they
remained within the available resource envelope.7 The diagnosis was proved
substantially correct in both countries as inflation was brought to a shuddering halt
almost overnight as soon as the cash-budget mechanisms began to bite. In both cases the
strict enforcement of the rules, combined with the creation of quasi-autonomous
revenue authorities, represented the central spar of the fiscal control regime in the
immediate post-stabilisation period. Why these institutions were successful is a question
of some debate (see Adam and Bevan 1999). In large part their principal role was
technical, providing a crude but effective operational framework against a background
of a history of weak fiscal control and limited technical capacity. Cash budget rules
tended to strengthen the hand of central agencies against that of the spending ministries
and consolidate fiscal control in the hands of those institutions and technocrats,
arguably those institutions most committed to donor supported macroeconomic
programmes. In addition to embedding day-to-day fiscal management within the culture
of public policy, the cash budget mechanism allowed governments to signal (and report
in a timely fashion on) the stance of fiscal policy, allowing aid flows to be sustained
from an otherwise sceptical donor community. To the extent that the successful
7 The greater flexibility in a system of the Ugandan type means that it is not rule-based to the same
degree as the Zambian type; but both systems have the common feature of renouncing a substantial
part of fiscal discretion. For simplicity, we here refer to all systems of this type as rule-based cash
budgets.17
operation of the cash budget under-pinned credibility, it also supported the downward
adjustment of inflation expectations (and hence expected nominal domestic interest
rates) held by the private sector.
Although rule-based mechanisms clearly played a central role in restoring price
stability, they were maintained not without costs. Given the counterfactual of a
continued lack of aggregate fiscal control, these costs were worth paying in the short
run, but as aggregate fiscal discipline is progressively entrenched the costs of preserving
it through inflexible budget rules become more significant. Aside from the operational
problems of maintaining too narrow a focus on the short-run cash balance, fiscal rules
of this type generate at least three other problems, each of which undermines efficient
fiscal policy. The first is that tight adherence to a cash-budget rule places the burden of
adjustment to short-term revenue fluctuations squarely onto expenditure and especially
on the operational and maintenance vote (since salaries are frequently ring-fenced). In
addition, in cases where revenue shortfalls do occur, cash-budget rules tend to favour
politically powerful ministries at the expense of weaker but no less important ministries
(see Stasavage and Moyo 1999). Second, in a growing economy with rising real money
demand by the private sector, the authorities, through the central bank, must be able to
supply the base money by running a fiscal (or quasi-fiscal) deficit. Limiting the growth
of base money through a cash budget in these circumstances represents an
inappropriately deflationary stance. The third general problem is that the cash budget
can back governments into adopting a possibly inappropriate stabilisation anchor in the
medium term. Given the relatively under-developed nature of monetary policy, pursuit
of a cash budget binds a government into a money-based stabilisation. However, there is
a general shift in thinking away from quantity-based towards price-based stabilisation,
for example in the form of direct inflation targeting for example. In the presence of the
short-run volatility in real money demand characteristic of a post-stabilisation
environment a money-based stabilisation rule is likely to be a relatively poor anchor for
domestic prices. However since pursuit of a strict cash budget requires governments
(and indeed the central bank) to forego other forms of intervention, including in
domestic asset and foreign exchange markets, the strict form of the rule can lead to a
higher than desired degree of volatility in domestic prices and the nominal exchange
rate.
Graduation
The appeal and strength of rule-based fiscal institutions lies in their simplicity and
transparency. In the spirit of the literature on central bank independence this creates the
basis for an effective agency of restraint, a relatively clearly observed rule, deviations
from which signal a loss of control, a confusion of objectives, or opportunistic
behaviour. However, with a measure of price stability achieved, the challenge for
countries that have adopted such instruments is to graduate to a broader discretionary
system that locates the control function of the cash budget within a more flexible
framework for budget management but does so without loosing the key agency of
restraint function provided by simple policy rules.
Such a budgetary framework is envisaged in the current debate on the reform of IMF
and World Bank lending operations, (see IMF 2000) which goes some way to reversing
the orthodoxy of the financial programming approach. Instead, the fiscal balance, rather
than the external balance, is placed at the heart of a poverty-reduction focussed18
macroeconomic framework. To some extent the prototype for this framework is
currently being developed in Uganda. Since its inception in the early 1990s as an
instrument for crisis management, the cash-flow has evolved into an integrated system
in which the control function of the rule is now only one element in the Medium-Term
Expenditure Framework (MTEF). The MTEF explicitly sets out to meet the criteria
noted at the beginning of this section. While the cash-rule is preserved as a key
operational tool, a defining feature of the MTEF is the weight placed on reversing
practices which have evolved during periods of poor fiscal control by bringing all donor
resource flows within the budget coordination framework. Although only time will tell
whether these reforms will succeed, early evidence suggests that the transparency and
domestic ‘ownership’ of the MTEF and PRSP process has helped support the
emergence of informed domestic constituencies capable of limiting fiscal indiscipline
(see Fozzard and Foster 2001).
6 Conclusion
For many low-income countries, there has been an extended period in which fiscal
policy was not a choice, or was a choice made by authorities external to the country. For
a number of them, this situation is now changing. Their own success in stabilising the
economy, coupled with a shift in the stance of the international community (most
notably the IMF), has placed fiscal choices back on the domestic agenda. However, the
scope for choice may be heavily circumscribed by the legacy of past fiscal laxity. There
are two challenges to the domestic fiscal authority in these circumstances. First they
must gauge how best to manage the transition from the immediate post-stabilisation
period to the longer term (post-post-stabilisation). Second, they must see how these
longer term fiscal choices can best accommodate the requirements of preserving
macroeconomic stability with the encouragement of growth and poverty reduction.
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